{"product_id":"rational-choice-politics-four-volume-set-sage-library-of-political-science-1st-ed","title":"Rational Choice Politics (Four-Volume Set) (Sage Library of Political Science) (1ST ed.)","description":"\n\u003ctable align=\"center\" border=\"0\" cellpadding=\"2\" cellspacing=\"0\" width=\"100%\"\u003e\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd class=\"productDetailSmallElements\"\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u003cstrong\u003eTable of Contents\u003c\/strong\u003e:\u003cbr\u003e\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tVOLUME 1: SOCIAL CHOICE AND EQUILIBRIUM \n\u003cbr\u003ePart 1: Social Choice \n\u003cbr\u003e On the Rationale of Group Decision-making - Duncan Black \n\u003cbr\u003e A Direct Proof of Arrow′ s Theorem - Julian H. Blau \n\u003cbr\u003e A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions - Amaryta Sen \n\u003cbr\u003e Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result - Allan Gibbard \n\u003cbr\u003ePart 2: Equilibrium \n\u003cbr\u003e A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility under Majority Rule - Charles R. Plott \n\u003cbr\u003e Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control - Richard D. McKelvey \n\u003cbr\u003e Generic Instability of Majority Rule - Norman Schofield \n\u003cbr\u003e Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions - William H. Riker \n\u003cbr\u003e On 64%-Majority Rule - Andrew Caplin and Barry Nalebuff \n\u003cbr\u003e Covering, Dominance, and Institution Free Properties of Social Choice - Richard D McKelvey \n\u003cbr\u003e The Uncovered Set and the Core - Gary C. Cox \n\u003cbr\u003e Bargaining in Legislatures - David P. Baron and John Ferejohn \n\u003cbr\u003e A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice - Jeffrey S. Banks and John Duggan \n\u003cbr\u003ePart 3: Electoral Systems \n\u003cbr\u003e Electoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions - Gary Cox \n\u003cbr\u003e A Voting Model Implying Duverger′s Law and Positive Turnout - Timothy J. Fedderson \n\u003cbr\u003e Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems - Massimo Morelli \n\u003cbr\u003eVOLUME 2: VOTING, ELECTIONS AND PRESSURE POLITICS \n\u003cbr\u003ePart 4: Voting and Elections \n\u003cbr\u003e A Theory of the Calculus of Voting - William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook \n\u003cbr\u003e Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty - Thomas R. Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal \n\u003cbr\u003e The Swing Voter′s Curse - Timothy J. Fedderson and Wolfgang Pesendorfer \n\u003cbr\u003e Voting as Communicating - Thomas Pickety \n\u003cbr\u003e The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model - Robert J. Barro \n\u003cbr\u003e Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control - John Ferejohn \n\u003cbr\u003e Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate motivations, uncertainty and convergence - Randall L. Calvert \n\u003cbr\u003e Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two Party System with Rational Voters - Alberto Alesina \n\u003cbr\u003e An Economic Model of Representative Democracy - Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate \n\u003cbr\u003e A Dynamical Model of Political Equilibrium - Gerald H. Kramer \n\u003cbr\u003e Elections, Coalitions, and Outcomes - David Austin-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks \n\u003cbr\u003e Elections, Governments and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems Pressure Politics - David P. Baron and Daniel Diermeier \n\u003cbr\u003ePart 5: Pressure Politics \n\u003cbr\u003e The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft - Gordon Tullock \n\u003cbr\u003e The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society - Anne O. Krueger \n\u003cbr\u003e A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence - Gary Becker \n\u003cbr\u003e On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests - Stephen Coates and Stephen Morris \n\u003cbr\u003e Legislators and Interest Groups: How unorganized interests get represented - Arthur T. Denzau and Michael C. Munger \n\u003cbr\u003e Protection for Sale - Gene Grossman and Elhanen Helpman \n\u003cbr\u003e The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective - William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner \n\u003cbr\u003eVOLUME 3: LEGISLATURES \n\u003cbr\u003ePart 6: Bureaucracy \n\u003cbr\u003e Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting over endogenous agendas - David Austen-Smith \n\u003cbr\u003e Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An analysis of sincere and sophisticated behavior - Arthur T. Denzau and Robert J. Mackay \n\u003cbr\u003e Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure - Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. Fedderson \n\u003cbr\u003e Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures - Daniel Diermeier and Roger B. Myerson \n\u003cbr\u003e Sophisticated Voting and Agenda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting - John Ferejohn, Fiorina P. Morris and Richard D. McKelvey \n\u003cbr\u003e Collective Decision Making and Standing Committee: An informational rationale for restrictive amendment procedures - Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel \n\u003cbr\u003e Buying Supermajorities - Timothy Groseclose and James Snyder \n\u003cbr\u003e Where′s the Party? - Keith Krehbiel \n\u003cbr\u003e On Division of the Question - John B. Kadane \n\u003cbr\u003e Coalitions and Cabinet Government - Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle \n\u003cbr\u003e Committee Design with Endogenous Information - Nicola Persico \n\u003cbr\u003e Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo - Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal \n\u003cbr\u003e Modelling the Interaction of Parties, Activists and Voters: Why is the political center empty? - Norman Schofield and Itai Sened \n\u003cbr\u003e Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multi-dimensional Voting Models - Kenneth A. Shepsle \n\u003cbr\u003e The Industrial Organization of Congress - Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall \n\u003cbr\u003eVOLUME 4: BUREAUCRACY, CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE STATE \n\u003cbr\u003ePart 7: Bureaucracy \n\u003cbr\u003e Agency Budgets, Cost Information, and Auditing - Jeffrey S. Banks \n\u003cbr\u003e Bureaucratic Expertise versus Legislative Authority: A model of deception and monitoring in budgeting - Jonathan Bendor, Serge Taylor and Roland Van Gaalen \n\u003cbr\u003e Delegation and the Structure of Policy-Making: A transactions cost politics approach - David Epstein and Sharyn O′Halloren \n\u003cbr\u003e Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy - John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan \n\u003cbr\u003e Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control - Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast \n\u003cbr\u003e Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police patrols versus fire alarms - Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz \n\u003cbr\u003ePart 8: Constitutional Arrangements \n\u003cbr\u003e The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-preserving federalism and economic development - Barry R. Weingast \n\u003cbr\u003e A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures - Charles M. Tiebout \n\u003cbr\u003e An Economic Theory of Clubs - James M. Buchanan \n\u003cbr\u003e The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in government - Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole \n\u003cbr\u003e Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto players and presidentialism, parliamentarism, multi-cameralism, and multipartism - George Tsebelis \n\u003cbr\u003ePart 9: The State \n\u003cbr\u003e Dictatorship, Democracy and Development - Mancur Olson \n\u003cbr\u003e Constitutions and Commitment: The evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth century england - Douglas C. North and Barry R. Weingast \n\u003cbr\u003e Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The case of the merchant guild - Anver Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry R. Weingast \n\u003cbr\u003e A Rational Theory of the Size of Government - Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard \n\u003cbr\u003e Comparative Politics and Public Finance - Torsten Persson, Gérard Roland and Guido Tabellini \n\u003cbr\u003e A Theory of Political Transitions - Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson \n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\n\u003cstrong\u003eBiographical Note\u003c\/strong\u003e:\u003cbr\u003e\n\u003cb\u003eTorun Dewan\u003c\/b\u003e is Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the LSE and has taught rational choice for many years. He has published in American Journal of Political Science and American Political Science Review. \n\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eKeith Dowding\u003c\/b\u003e is Professor of Political Science at London School of Economics and is about to take up a position of Professor of Political Science at the Australian National University, Canberra, ACT. He has published widely in rational choice, public administration, urban studies, British and comparative politics as well as political philosophy. He has been co-editor of the Journal of Theoretical Politics for almost a decade.\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eKenneth A. Shepsle\u003c\/b\u003e is Professor of Government at Harvard University. He has long been recognized as one of the leading scholars in rational choice theory. His groundbreaking work on the organization of legislatures has been immensely influential as has his more recent work on coalition formation and overlapping generations. He has published widely on US government and is the author of a leading textbook on rational choice.\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\n\u003cstrong\u003ePublisher Marketing\u003c\/strong\u003e:\u003cbr\u003e\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tThe formal modeling techniques of rational choice theory have become central to the discipline of political science, for example with regard to the understanding of the working of legislatures, coalition governments, executive-bureaucracy relations, or electoral systems. The collection includes the very best work in this field, as well as an editors′ introduction to each volume that describes the importance of the articles and their place in political science. \n\u003cbr\u003e\n\u003cbr\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eVolume I: Social Choice and Equilibrium \u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eVolume II: Voting, Elections and Electoral Systems \u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eVolume III: Legislatures and Pressure Politics \u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eVolume IV: Bureaucracy, Constitutional Arrangements and the State\u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003c\/ul\u003e\n\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\n\n\u003cbr\u003e\n\u003cbr\u003e\n\u003c\/td\u003e\n\u003c\/tr\u003e\n\u003c\/table\u003e\n","brand":"Sage Publications Ltd","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47448636031107,"sku":"9781412945028","price":1815.6,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0564\/6830\/8099\/files\/9781412945028.jpg?v=1783317518","url":"https:\/\/sebink.com\/products\/rational-choice-politics-four-volume-set-sage-library-of-political-science-1st-ed","provider":"Sebink","version":"1.0","type":"link"}